Fig. 4. [illegible]

a very strong one as she was definitely in opposition to Sheikh Mahmud of Sulaimani, head of the holy family of Barzinji sheikhs[8], and the representative of the dream of a free and independent Kurdistan. Lady Adila died in 1924 during the British mandate period. Her grave, which I visited as a burial ground near the village of Alaibaik, some distance from Halabja, was in 1957 deserted and neglected. My interpreter told me that it was in accordance with Lady Adila's own wish that her grave was neither marked nor maintained, but added that people drove sheep and goats over the grave, and that, altogether, there was but little sympathy for the memory of Lady Adila of Halabja, an attitude that appeared to be shared by my interpreter, who, on another occasion, referred with the deepest veneration to Lady Adila's political opponent Sheikh Mahmud, as the real ruler and noble (king) of Kurdistan.

Whereas Lady Adila thus cooperated with the British mandate authorities at the beginning of the twenties, another prominent woman, Hafsa Khan, cousin of Sheikh Mahmud and married to his brother, Sheikh Kader, arose in the opposition circles of Sulaimani. She was sufficiently wise to accept

S: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

majority of the population are Khanaqin, Kifri, Kal Sanjaq, Rawandiz, Aqra, Amadiya, Dohuk and Zakho. Kirkuk city is very mixed but contains a large Kurdish element. The professional and intellectual classes, as well as the larger land-owners, tend, as would be expected, to collect in the towns, and there is always a steady drift of these out of Kurdistan to Baghdad.

The rural element consists for the most part of settled villagers; the nomads, once numerous, now form only a small proportion of the whole. Though not all villagers are in fact tribesmen, the organization of society outside the towns may be said, for all practical purposes, still to be essentially tribal, with groups of villages owing a kind of feudal allegiance to a landlord, a Shaykh of one of the dervish fraternities, or a tribal Agha who may have imposed himself on the village by force. With the progressive consolidation of the authority of the administration, and with the spread of education, the villagers have not unnaturally begun to refuse to submit to the impositions, sanctioned by ancient custom perhaps but not enforceable at law, by which these barons, especially the Aghas having no title to the land, were accustomed to maintain their position. In many parts of the country the old social organization is breaking down.

II.

The south-western boundary of Iraqi Kurdistan runs for most of its length across the plain. But immediately to the north-east of the line the ground begins to rise, first as a maze of foothills, and then in a series of long, parallel, limestone ridges running from south-east to north-west, each loftier than the last, up to the main chain of Zagros, which over much of its length marks the Persian frontier. In the extreme north-west these ranges merge into the eastern extension of the Taurus system. On the Persian frontier there are many peaks of over 10,000 feet. It follows that there is a great variety of climatic conditions. The country is traversed by three important affluents of the Tigris, the Great Zab from Turkey, and the Little Zab and the Sirwan (Diyala) from Persia.

A railway from Baghdad following closely the line of the old high road through Kifri and Kirkuk to Arbil serves Kurdistan south of the Great Zab; the main line up the right bank of the Tigris links Mosul directly with Baghdad and, as already mentioned, skirts the Kurdish districts of the extreme north-west. Most of the market towns are now accessible by automobile. Transportation in the remoter highlands and between villages is by mule and donkey; oxen are still used by the nomads as beasts of burden.

7: Earth E-S (1951)- 1953 WAll Rand WAll

unem of the *Ratz* lineage follows from common marriage usage, and is no different in nature from the separateness of the wealthier as compared to the poorer lineage sections of the group.

The hereditary position as *Ratz* is simply vested in the leading lineage segment of the *tira*. An interesting problem arises as to what adjustments are made in the event of decline in wealth or the appearance of other impediments to leadership in this lineage. It is customary for persons in a position of leadership to appoint their successor, usually a son, while they are still in a position of control. In the case of disagreement between the existing *Ratz* and the general population as to who should succeed him, the pattern of succession is probably decided by the bias in the balance between the positive power (primarily economic) of the *Ratz*, and the degree of general resentment to his decision. Where the power and prestige of the *Ratz* has declined, leadership might thus fairly easily be shifted to a stronger and wealthier collateral line. (Compare p. 126 for a more nearly «democratic» mechanism of appointing successor to the *Ratz*.)

I had no opportunity to ascertain the actual extent of the power vested in the *Ratz*. It would seem to be rather dependent on his means and personality, but, these permitting, to afford him considerable possibilities to enforce his decisions. He is on the other hand regarded as being subject to the *Beys* in all matters, and directly responsible to them.

The *Beg* leaders of the Jaf are sometimes represented as belonging to a *tira* of their own, the *Begzade*; more correctly the *Begzade* is regarded as a family or *boz*, divided into the three branches Welled Begi, Kikhasraw Begi, and Bahram Begi. The political head may be drawn from any of these. The Kikhasraw Begi and Bahram Begi of today are descended by 7 generations from the common ancestor Zahir Beg. The Welled Begi are somewhat further removed. All the *Begzade* are now settled and live as absentee landowners of numerous Jaf and other villages. It is thus extremely difficult to form any picture of the true position of the leaders in the political organization of the nomadic Jaf. Some 40 years ago, authority was divided between the two Begzade brothers Osman and Mahmud Pasha, the latter being the leader of the nomadic section, Mahmud Pasha was

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• 695 the last of the leaders to allow the nomads on their annual migrations. Today the 2—300 who have remained nomads receive only slight attention. A description of the *Jol Beg* at the time of Rich, (op. cit.) in 1820, paints him with considerable sympathy as a powerful and despotic patriarchal ruler. A similar exhalted position is indicated for 1908 by Soane's description of the *Pasha* receiving the first cucumbers of the season, rushed to him on a foaming horse over some 10 dusty kilometres. (Soane, 1912, p. 207).

696 An important institute reinforcing the powers of the Begzade is the *Pyshtmale* (= round-the-house), a group of men recruited from all *tirac*, who protect and perform services in the home of the *Beg*, and used to serve aboutyguard. As well as constituting a type of levied tax, this grew paralleled the Viking *lord* in form and function, being constantly at hand to maintain the *Beg*'s position, effectively and immediately executing his orders. The composite origin of the group, as the fact that it included members of *all tirac*, made the *Pyshtmac* more readily subject to discipline than a group recruited on anyother principles, and extricated the *Beg* from the need to create dangerous factionalism and initiate feud by using one traditional *tirorganization* to control an other.

697 The functions of the *Jol* confederacy, and the reasons for its permanence where simil organizations among settled people have been at best very ephemeral, pose interesting problems. Presumably, the direct advantages to all the nomads of a larger confederacy have always been evident enough to encourage submission to the central authority of the *Beg*s. Some advantages were considerably greater for the nomads than thy would be for the settled tribes. Firstly, since all the property of the nomad is movable, he may lose everything if he is raided, where the farmer at worst loses one year's crop. Secondly, a high degree of concentration of population is possible in temporary tent-camps, wherein the agriculturalists necessarily live in smaller, more widy scattered communities. Given the social mechanism, there were thus no physical obstacles to large groups of nomads driving their flocks together and uniting for defence in times of strife while the villagers, to protect their property, were forced to remain scattered over the countryside. Thirdly, a larger

organized unit gave a direct economic advantage to the nomads in their relations with the settled population. The Jaf, by commingling men and animals, were able to descend on whole valleys, tyrannizing the local villagers by their larger numbers, and freely graze their flocks on pastures and fields belonging to the settled people. 692

This confederacy was admittedly not based on any lineage principle of common descent, since it counts among its members numerous tribes; yet all Jaf insist that the ruling position of the *Begzade* lineage has never been questioned. The fact that a central core of real Jaf can trace common descent surely contributes to stability. Furthermore, the *Begzade* group may have been large enough so there would constantly be a number of pretenders to the position as leader of the subtribe. Thus, if the pressure of exploitation became too great, the commoners could give their support to a competing pretender within the royal lineage, who would then be in a position to gain ascendancy.

The formal position of the *Jaf Begzade* is thus conceptually different from that of the *Rateze* of the separate tribes. The leaders of tribes and their segments are acclaimed, and should ideally base their power on informal sanctions. This «consensual» type of authority seems to be inherent in the principles on which a segmentary lineage organization is based. E. g. Peters (1951) discusses the organization of the Cyrenaica Bedouin in terms of the opposition of lineage segments of a like order of segmentation, and emphasizes the absence of a real *hierarchy* of political offices. Any Bedouin shaikh of a primary section must necessarily also belong to a specific secondary and tertiary section within it, and he can function as informal leader of the other sub-sections in his primary section only when it is in opposition to *another* primary section; in other situations, the unity of the primary section breaks down. The only way leadership can be stabilized and a hierarchy of authority established is by divorcing the super-ordinated leader and his group from the segmentary structure of the tribe as a whole. This is achieved in the case of the *Jaf Begzade* by elevating that whole lineage group to a semi-royal status. In relation to the Cyrenaica Bedouin, the Saxons may for a time have occupied a structurally somewhat similar position (cf. Evans-Prit- 693 • 694

§42 chard, 1949). The presence of the *Jaf Begzade* as political heads §43 necessarily affects the internal organization of the various *Jaf tira*, and the segmentary nature of the lineage organization is therefore not expressed fully. Each *Rais* becomes de-facto vested with some authority as the representative of the permanently established *Jaf Begzade*, and the political structure is thus actually a compromise between a truly segmentary lineage organization and a hierarchical organization.

§42. As far as its formal structure goes, the *Jaf* confederacy seems extremely similar to the political system of the early Mongols, as described e. g. by Hudson: The prominence of Chenghis Khan's lineage is phrased by him in terms of the vassalization of other descent groups, to emphasize that «all the subjects of the Khan were considered as the vassals not of the ruler but of his family and his close kinsmen as represented by him» (op. cit., p. 92). Essentially the same might well be said of the relation between the *tira* of the *Jaf* confederacy and their *Begzade* lineage. It is interesting to speculate whether, since the political mechanism seems to be present, it was merely the difficulties of topography that prevented the *Jaf* and similar Kurdish confederacies from forming the larger units that one finds in the Central Asian steppe area.

§42 §43 §48 The immediate modifications in *Jaf* formal structure made necessary by the adoption of sedentary life and agriculture are slight, though the meanings and importance attaching to the various aspects of the organization change radically. Generally, each *Khel* settles in a part of the old *tira* pastures, and the informal head of the *Khel* becomes the formally elected *Kekhe* (mayor or headman) of the resulting village. Any one *tira* thus tends to split up completely, some *Khels* settling at the winter camp sites around Qizil Robat, others 80 km. N.E. on the autumn campsites of Shahr-i-zur. Whereas tribal unity thus loses its significance, each village is registered as the property of one or another of the *Begzade*, and *Jaf* identification, as well as the acceptance of *Begzade* leadership, is natural.

and so on ending at the village level. The leader of any category of group is called *Agha*, any branch or named section thereof will in certain contexts be called a *tira*.

The genealogy of these branches is traced, but varies somewhat from villages to village. Such variations derive partly from the lack of interest in collateral units, partly from an attempt to stress certain relationships or to construct a more flattering genealogy.

Descent is traced in male line from the common ancestor Hamma, the founder or the tira, nine generations removed from the present



Diagram No. 4. A Turgah model of their position in the Hamawand formal organization.

adult group. The origins of Hamma, having no political significance in the group, are of little interest to the villagers, though Arabic origin is occasionally claimed for its prestige value.

One version was collected in the village of Koni Sard: Hamma had 4 sons, Saffar, Yadjar, Rashid, and Ramazan; from these are descended the 4 major branches of the group. The villagers themselves claim to be Yadjar. They could indicate the areas where the descendants of the three other sons live, but were unable or uninterested in tracing relations in any greater detail.

In the village of Turgah, a somewhat different version was given. The major branches were named as Ramawand, Safarwand, Rasho-

7: Barth 8-5 (1951) 1953 WAll Kurd WAll

wood, and Begzade. As will be noticed, the branch of Yadjar, to 4.1 which the Koni Surdie belong, is not in this list. The Koni Surdie 4.14 in fact belong to the Begzade branch, so either Yadjar is the ancestor 4.13 ● of all the Begzade, or a smaller segment category has been elevated to the level of a major branch, for the greater glory of the Koni Surd group. The villagers in Tazgah assert to belong to the Babiswand division, again made up of the villagers from Tazgah and Chalokachal, the latter now having been abandoned and the villagers scattered. The Babiswand were derived from the Rashawand, in unspecified fashion. A Tazgah model of their position in the *tire* would then read as shown in Diagram No. 4.

The *Aghe* of a village is appointed or granted power by the male 4.12 inhabitants of that village. In practice, the position is hereditary, but not according to any rule of seniority, and village preference undoubtedly influences the pattern of succession. The village *Aghe* has only the authority which follows from his own power and prestige, and the goodwill of his followers.

The position as *Aghe* of one of the four major branches is either similarly hereditary, or, if there is no suitable son of the old *Aghe*, a new *Aghe* is elected by the villagers. These *Aghes* will generally have the position and means to support a group of retainers, paralleling the *Pyadetmale* of the *Jaf Begs*. They thus have a vaguely institutionalized mechanism to enforce their authority. Thus, though the formal position of the *Aghes* of the four major Hamawand segments is unlike that of the *Jaf Begzade*, the actual differences more reflect the difference in scale than in formal position.

Neither the Jaf nor the Hatkawand lineage organizations function 4.14 in the «ideal» pattern closely exemplified by the Cyrenaica Bedouin, discussed above. A position of authority and super-ordination does in fact become vested in the individual *Aghe* and *Raiz*, who tends to apply coercive means to support such a hierarchy of authority. Though the ideal «charter» of the political structure is that of a segmentary lineage organization, the system does in fact function in a somewhat different pattern, as will be shown more fully later.

NORTHERN 'IRAQ AND ITS PEOPLES

resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a broken lilt. Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish. Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle, and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle moves slowly round. Often one dancer who fancy himself as budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by themselves. As a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in otherwise on the mountainside, often far from their villages.

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all of its savage and primitive features. Government had no power and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he completely dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who has the shaikh's bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy. Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the strongest methods. Such complete ascendency did Shaikh Ahmed gain over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plentiful in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal Air Force.